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Abstract
We study how stochasticity in the evolution of agricultural productivity interacts with
economic and population growth at the global level. We use a two-sector Schumpeterian
model of growth, in which a manufacturing sector produces the traditional consumption
good and an agricultural sector produces food to sustain contemporaneous population. Agri-
culture demands land as an input, itself treated as a scarce form of capital. In our model
both population and sectoral technological progress are endogenously determined, and key
technological parameters of the model are structurally estimated using 1960-2010 data on
world GDP, population, cropland and technological progress. Introducing random shocks to
the evolution of total factor productivity in agriculture, we show that uncertainty optimally
requires more land to be converted into agricultural use as a hedge against production shor-
tages, and that it significantly affects both optimal consumption and population trajectories.
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Between 1960 and 2010, the world population rose from about three to seven billion, more than
it had increased in the previous two millennia (United Nations, 1999a), while real global GDP
per capita increased by a factor of about 2.5 (World Bank, 2016). With more people to feed and a
positive relationship between income per capita and food consumption per capita (Subramanian
and Deaton, 1996; Tilman et al., 2011), aggregate food demand increased significantly. Over
the same 50 years, however, agricultural production almost tripled, mostly on account of a
sustained increase in agricultural productivity (Alexandratos and Bruinsma, 2012), with the
result that food did not become more scarce, globally on aggregate (Alston and Pardey, 2014).
Turning to the future, the global population is projected to continue expanding by several billion
– likely reaching 10 billion before 2060 (United Nations, 2015) – and global GDP per capita
might double by mid-century (Clarke et al., 2014). Hence further improvements in agricultural
productivity will need to take place, driven by innovation and technology adoption.
In this paper we study how uncertainty and variability in agricultural output affect the ability
to feed a large, growing and increasingly rich global population. As we show in Figure 1, global
average total factor productivity (TFP) growth in agriculture has been around one per cent per
year over the period 1960 to 2010, contributing greatly to meeting the increase in food demand.
But it also shows that there has been large variation in growth rates across regions and over time,
ranging from -17 to +20 per cent per year.1
Weather variability is one cause of the stochasticity in the historical agricultural TFP series.
As Auffhammer and Schlenker (2014) observe in their review, the relationship between weather
(specifically temperature) and yields is highly nonlinear and concave (also see Schlenker and
Roberts, 2009). Consequently extreme weather (heat) over the growing season is a strong pre-
dictor of crop yields. Anthropogenic climate change is expected to change patterns of weather
variability worldwide, and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change thinks that anthro-
1 Data on TFP growth are derived from Fuglie and Rada (2015) and FAO (2015). We use the growth accounting
methodology of Fuglie and Rada (2015), which takes into account a broad set of inputs and aggregates TFP
growth rates at the level of 27 macro regions. Compared to Fuglie and Rada (2015), who apply a Hodrick-
Prescott filter to smooth year-on-year output fluctuations before calculating TFP, TFP growth rates reported
in Figure 1 are based on raw (unsmoothed) output data from FAO (2015), with the purpose of highlighting
variability of agricultural productivity growth.
1
pogenic climate change is somewhere between “very likely” and “virtually certain” to result in
more frequent incidences of extreme heat, depending on the definition and timescale (IPCC,
2013). The same source also suggests an increased frequency of other types of extreme weather,
with varying, but generally lower, degrees of confidence. Other emerging sources of variability
in agricultural TFP have also been put forward, including the loss of genetic and species diver-
sity in farming systems (Di Falco, 2012), and increasing homogeneity of global food supplies
(Khoury et al., 2014), making them potentially more vulnerable to covariate shocks.
Inspired by these risks, some long-standing and some only now emerging, in this paper we
study the socially optimal global response to the risk of negative shocks to global agricultural
productivity. To do so we employ a stochastic version of a quantitative, two-sector endogenous
growth model of the global economy introduced in Lanz et al. (2017). This provides an integra-
ted framework to study the joint evolution of global population, sectoral technological progress,
per-capita income, the demand for food, and agricultural land expansion (from a finite reserve
of unconverted land). Specifically, the model distinguishes agriculture from other sectors of
the economy (which produce a bundle of consumption goods) and treats population, land, and
sectoral TFP as endogenous stock variables. The level of population in the model derives from
preferences over fertility by a representative household (Barro and Becker, 1989), with fertility
costs capturing two components. First, additional labor units demand food, and the level of
per-capita food demand is proportional to income. In the model, food is produced by the agri-
cultural sector, so that the evolution of agricultural productivity may act as a constraint on the
evolution of population. A second fertility cost is the time needed to rear and educate children.
Our model builds on the work of Galor and Weil (2000) by incorporating an increasing relati-
onship between the level of technology in the economy and the cost of population increments.
Technological progress raises education requirements and the demand for human capital, cap-
turing the well-documented complementarity between technology and skills (Goldin and Katz,
1998).
Given the explicit representation of fertility decisions and the demand for food associated
with population and income growth, the model is well-suited to study the role of technology as
a driver of global economic development. In the model, sectoral technological progress is endo-
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genously determined by the Schumpeterian R&D model of Aghion and Howitt (1992), in which
TFP growth is a function of labor hired by R&D firms. Thus, on the one hand technological
progress in agriculture reduces the cost of producing food, and is an important driver of agricul-
tural yields. In turn, agricultural technology improvements can alleviate Malthusian concerns
about the finite land input. On the other hand, economy-wide technological progress implies
a quantity-quality trade-off in fertility choices (through increasing education costs), and thus a
slowdown of population growth (as per Galor and Weil, 2000). Taken together, technological
progress is central to the development path generated by the model.
As discussed in detail in Lanz et al. (2017), we use simulation methods to structurally es-
timate key parameters of the model, minimizing the distance between observed and simulated
1960-2010 trajectories for world GDP, population, TFP growth and agricultural land area. The
estimated model closely replicates targeted data over the estimation period, and is also able to
replicate untargeted moments, such as the share of agriculture in world GDP and the growth
rate of agricultural yields.
In this article, we introduce uncertainty about the evolution of agricultural TFP in the co-
ming years. Our objective is not to carry out an assessment of some specific uncertain event.
Instead, our contribution is to provide an internally consistent picture of how uncertainty in the
evolution of agricultural technology affects the socially optimal allocation of resources in a fra-
mework with endogenous population, land conversion, and R&D-based TFP growth. Our TFP
shocks are therefore illustrative in nature, although they are calibrated to be within the same
order of magnitude as shocks observed in the past. In the baseline, agricultural TFP growth
starts at around one per cent per year in 2010 and declines thereafter. This implies that agri-
cultural yields increase linearly, which is consistent with extrapolating data on trend growth in
yields from the past several decades, particularly for the main grain crops (e.g. Alston et al.,
2009; Godfray et al., 2010). Given the structure of productivity shocks we consider, there is a
73 per cent probability that this baseline situation prevails in 2030. If, on the other hand, nega-
tive productivity shocks occur, and realized shocks are permanent in the sense that they affect
agricultural productivity in all subsequent periods, by 2030 there is a 24 per cent probability
that agricultural TFP is around 10 per cent lower relative to its baseline value, a 3 per cent
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probability that it is 15 per cent lower, and a 0.1 per cent probability that it is more than 20 per
cent lower.
In the model, the socially optimal response to uncertain agricultural productivity shocks
occurs in a number of key dimensions. First, given a risk of lower agricultural productivity in
the future, more labor can be allocated to R&D, so as to speed up technological progress. Second,
when a negative shock occurs, more primary factors can be allocated to agricultural production,
specifically labor, capital and land. Here, increasing agricultural land area involves a decision
to deplete a finite reserve base, so there is an intertemporal trade-off involved. Third, changes
in agricultural productivity affect population growth through food availability. In particular,
depreciation of agricultural technology increases the relative cost of food, with a negative effect
on fertility decisions, so that agricultural productivity shocks affect equilibrium trajectories in
the long run. Finally, per-capita consumption also adjusts downwards, as more resources are
allocated to the agricultural sector at the expense of manufacturing production.
Results from the model indicate that the risk of negative shocks to agricultural TFP induces
a substantial reallocation of resources relative to the baseline. The planner allocates more re-
sources to agricultural R&D, but we find that, once a negative shock has occurred, agricultural
TFP does not catch up with its baseline path. Thus in our framework it is too expensive for
the planner to simply compensate lost agricultural TFP with supplementary R&D expenditure.
Rather the planner expands use of other primary inputs to agriculture. But, since there is an
opportunity cost of labor and capital (which are also used to produce the manufactured good),
the main response of the planner is to increase the area of agricultural land. The result that
negative TFP shocks imply additional land conversion to sustain agricultural production, or in
other words a response at the extensive margin, is consistent with farm-level empirical results
reported in Roberts and Schlenker (2013) and Scott (2013). In addition, as technology shocks
make food more expensive to produce, a second major implication is that population declines
relative to the baseline.
We carry out several extensions to the main analysis just described. First, we quantify how
substitutability between land and other primary inputs to agriculture affects the finding that
agricultural land is expanded. Our initial assumption is derived from the empirical work of
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Wilde (2013), which suggests an elasticity of substitution between land and other inputs of 0.6.
We show that lower substitutability implies a significantly larger expansion of agricultural land
in response to productivity shocks. Second, we shed light on the the role of per-capita income
in the demand for food, by running a model in which food demand is simply proportional to
population. This is equivalent to assuming a subsistence constraint, as considered by Strulik
and Weisdorf (2008) for example, with zero income elasticity of food demand. Results suggest
that agricultural land expansion is very similar, but the welfare cost of the productivity shocks
is significantly larger. Finally, while our main set of runs is concerned with the occurrence of
uncertain negative shocks to an otherwise increasing trend for agricultural productivity, the lite-
rature also raises the possibility of gradually stagnating and decreasing agricultural productivity
(e.g. Alston et al., 2009). We therefore use the model to study a scenario in which trend agri-
cultural productivity growth gradually slows and eventually goes into reverse. The model again
suggests an extension of cropland area in order to compensate productivity losses.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. First, we discuss how our work relates
to a number of strands of the literature. Second, we provide an overview of the model and esti-
mation procedure, and then describe how we introduce stochasticity in agricultural productivity.
Third, we report our simulation results, sensitivity analysis, and discuss our findings. We close
with some concluding comments.
Relation to the literature
Our work is related to at least two distinctive strands of literature that consider interactions
between economic growth, food production and population development. First, our article is
related to the seminal work of Galor and Weil (2000) and Jones (2001), which is aimed at
fundamental understanding of the joint evolution of economic growth and population over the
long run, and to Hansen and Prescott (2002), Strulik and Weisdorf (2008), Vollrath (2011),
Sharp et al. (2012) and Strulik and Weisdorf (2014), who also consider the role of agriculture
and land in growth. Related work by Bretschger (2013) and Peretto and Valente (2015) studies
natural resource scarcity in a general, growth-theoretic setting. While our approach shares these
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theoretical underpinnings, it is distinctive in that key parameters of our quantitative model
are structurally estimated, so that our model closely replicates observed trajectories over the
past fifty years. In turn this allows us to investigate quantitatively the implications of stylized
uncertainty about future technological progress.
Second, our work is related to the literature on structural modeling of global agriculture,
land use and food trade, which is used to estimate the impact of future climate change. Many
of these models are brought together in the Agricultural Model Intercomparison and Impro-
vement Project (AgMIP) (see in particular Nelson and Shively, 2014, and other papers in the
same volume), which suggests that climate change could reduce global crop yields significantly
and result in an increase of global cropland area. The models used to derive these results fe-
ature high-resolution sectoral and regional representations of agriculture and land use, which
allows investigations into specific crops, regional impacts and trade. On the other hand, the
evolution of key drivers determining global impacts (such as population, the demand for food,
and agricultural yields) is exogenous to the simulations. By contrast, the model we formulate
endogenizes global aggregate population, per-capita income, and technology, which allows us to
study how these variables jointly respond to uncertainty about future agricultural productivity
growth. Our work also differs in how uncertainty about agricultural productivity is implemen-
ted. In structural modeling of climate impacts, different scenarios are used to introduce gradual
changes in long-run average conditions, changes that are precisely calibrated on the outputs of
climate and crop models. Our scenarios focus instead on short-run (but persistent) productivity
shocks, which are calibrated to an order of magnitude on variability in past agricultural TFP, but
are more illustrative in spirit.
A paper in this line of research that is particularly close in spirit to our work is Cai et al.
(2014), as they use a dynamic-stochastic partial equilibrium model of global land use to study
the risk of an irreversible reduction in agricultural productivity. They show that, by 2100, this
risk increases the demand for cropland globally, at the expense of valuable biodiversity and
ecosystem services. Our work shares the purpose of Cai et al. (2014), but is otherwise comple-
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mentary: while their work considers more finely partitioned land uses,2 ours emphasizes the
role of endogenous technological progress through R&D activities, and also allows population
to respond to changes in agricultural productivity through endogenous fertility.
As we consider responses to agricultural productivity shocks, our work also relates to an
extensive microeconometric literature that studies variability in agricultural productivity. One
line of research exploits exogenous variations in rainfall to quantity the impact of TFP variations
on outcomes in the agricultural sector (see notably Jayachandran, 2006; Di Falco and Chavas,
2008). Close to our main topic of interest, Auffhammer et al. (2006) have shown that rainfall
variability affects the choice of cropland area under cultivation at the farm level.3 In a similar
vein, Roberts and Schlenker (2013) and Scott (2013) study how agricultural land area in the
U.S. responds to exogenous shocks, showing a significant response on the extensive margin.
As noted by Auffhammer and Schlenker (2014), one limitation of these reduced-form studies is
that long-run effects and feedback mechanisms (e.g. general equilibrium) are difficult to identify
from the data. From this perspective, our structural empirical model provides novel perspectives
on these issues, accounting for a number of macro-level interrelationships between endogenous
outcomes, and quantifying how these jointly respond to negative agricultural supply shocks.
It is also important to stress that our aggregate global representation has its limitations, and
abstracts from a number of dimensions that have been discussed in the literature. First, by con-
struction, our model cannot inform spatial aspects of development, which include international
markets for agricultural commodities, and trade. In particular, because the world as a whole
is modeled as one region, factors are mobile in our framework, and openness to trade is only
implicit. Our model is, however, consistent with a multiregional model with trade in which the
expansion of agricultural land is incentivized through changes in international commodity pri-
ces. For example, a negative agricultural supply shock in a given region may not have an impact
on population or agricultural land area in that particular region, but if the shock is large enough
2 More specifically, Cai et al. (2014) consider the allocation of land to commercially managed forests (with many
different stock variables capturing different forest vintages) and to biofuel crops. Forest products and energy are
consumed by households. Non-converted ‘natural’ land generates ecosystem services, which are also valued by
households.
3 See also Schlenker and Roberts (2009) and Fezzi and Bateman (2015) on the role of temperature variability.
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to have macro-level repercussions (as we do assume in our work), it will cause an increase in
world agricultural prices. This would in turn affect outcomes in price-sensitive regions (typically
developing regions), including fertility choices and agricultural land expansion.4 This is consis-
tent with Burgess and Donaldson (2010) and Costinot et al. (2016) for example, who emphasize
the role of interregional price signals in the allocation of resources, as well as the literature that
uses detailed numerical trade models of agricultural production, mentioned above.
Second, our model does not capture more complex institutional dimensions of growth and
food production that have been discussed elsewhere in the literature. One example is related to
political dynamics at work in the presence of agricultural output variability. Using data from Sub-
Saharan Africa, Brückner and Ciccone (2011) suggest that negative agricultural supply shocks
may provide a window of opportunity for improved democracy. In turn, improved democracy
would be expected to have a positive impact on economic growth (Acemoglu et al., 2017). In
our model, while negative shocks do lead to faster TFP growth, the channel through which TFP
increases (labor-intensive R&D) is inconsistent with an institutional view of growth. Similarly,
an extensive literature studies how local scarcities induce conflict and migration (see e.g. Prieur
and Schumacher, 2016, for an overview); the associated welfare costs are only implicit in our
highly aggregated representation of the world. Therefore, while our empirical framework brings
together several well-established strands of economic research to provide novel insights into the
impacts of negative agricultural productivity shocks, its limitations ought to be kept in mind.
The model
This section first summarizes the key components of the model. Second, we present the simulation-
based structural estimation procedure. Third, we explain how we introduce stochastic shocks to
4 Note that our model accounts for the fact that remaining reserve lands are likely to be less productive, compared
to land already under cultivation. We come back to this below.
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the evolution of agricultural productivity.5
The economy
Manufacturing production and agriculture
A manufacturing sector produces the traditional consumption bundle in one-sector models, with
aggregate output Yt,mn at time t given by:
Yt,mn = At,mnK
ϑ
t,mnL
1−ϑ
t,mn ,(1)
where At,mn is TFP in manufacturing, Kt,mn is capital and Lt,mn is the workforce.6 The share of
capital is set to 0.3, which is consistent with Gollin (2002), for example.
Agricultural output Yt,ag is given by a flexible nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
function (see Kawagoe et al., 1986; Ashraf et al., 2008), in which the lower nest is Cobb-Douglas
in capital and labor, and the upper nest trades off the capital-labor composite with the land input
Xt:
Yt,ag = At,ag
[
(1− θX)
(
KθKt,agL
1−θK
t,ag
)σ−1
σ
+ θXX
σ−1
σ
t
] σ
σ−1
,(2)
where σ determines substitution possibilities between the capital-labor composite and land. Fol-
lowing empirical evidence reported in Wilde (2013), representing long-term substitution possi-
bilities between land and other factors in agriculture, we set σ = 0.6. We further set the share
parameters θX = 0.25 and θK = 0.3 based on data from Hertel et al. (2012).
Innovations and technological progress
5 As noted above, Lanz et al. (2017) provides a comprehensive motivation for the structure of the model, analytical
results on the evolution of population and land, discussion of the selection and estimation of the parameters, as
well as ensuing baseline projections from 2010 onwards. Extensive sensitivity analysis is also reported, showing
that the baseline projections are robust to a number of changes to the structure of the model, which comes from
the fact that we estimate the model over a relatively long horizon. The GAMS code for the model replicating the
baseline runs reported here is available on Bruno Lanz’s website.
6 Note that under the assumption that technology is Hicks-neutral, the Cobb-Douglas functional form is consistent
with long-term empirical evidence reported in Antràs (2004).
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The evolution of sectoral TFP is given by (in the absence of negative productivity shocks, discus-
sed below):
At+1,j = At,j · (1 + ρt,jS) , j ∈ {mn, ag} ,(3)
where j is an index for sectors (here mn is manufacturing and ag is agriculture), S = 0.05 is the
maximum aggregate growth rate of TFP each period (based on Fuglie, 2012), and ρt,j ∈ [0, 1]
measures the arrival rate of innovations, i.e. how much of the maximum growth rate is achieved
each period. TFP growth in the model, which is driven by ρt,j , is a function of labor allocated to
sectoral R&D:
ρt,j = λj
(
Lt,Aj
Nt
)µj
, j ∈ {mn, ag} ,(4)
where Lt,Aj is labor employed in R&D for sector j, λj is a productivity parameter (normalized
to 1 to ensure that TFP growth is bounded between 0 and S) and µj ∈ (0, 1) is an elasticity. The
parameters µmn and µag are structurally estimated and capture the extent of decreasing returns
to labor in R&D (e.g. duplication of ideas among researchers; Jones and Williams, 2000).
Expressions (3) and (4) represent a discrete-time version of the original model by Aghion
and Howitt (1992), in which the arrival of innovations is modeled as a continuous-time Poisson
process.7 One key departure from Aghion and Howitt (1992), however, is that the growth rate
of TFP is a function of the share of labor allocated to R&D. This representation, which is also
discussed in Jones (1995a) and Chu et al. (2013), is consistent with microfoundations of more
recent product-line representations of technological progress (e.g. Dinopoulos and Thompson,
1998; Peretto, 1998; Young, 1998), in which individual workers are hired by R&D firms and
entry of new firms is allowed (Dinopoulos and Thompson, 1999). One feature of such repre-
sentations, and therefore of ours, is the absence of the population scale effect, in other words
a positive equilibrium relationship between the size of the population and technological pro-
7 We implicitly make use of the law of large number to integrate out random arrival of innovation over discrete
time intervals.
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gress.8 Indeed, over time the entry of new firms dilutes R&D inputs and neutralizes the scale
effect, and in equilibrium aggregate TFP growth is proportional to the share of labor in R&D (see
Laincz and Peretto, 2006).
Population dynamics
Population in the model represents the stock of effective labor units Nt and evolves according
to the standard motion equation:
Nt+1 = Nt(1 + nt − δN ) , N0 given ,(5)
where 1/δN captures the expected working lifetime, which is set to 45 years (hence δN = 0.022),
and increments to the labor force ntNt are a function of labor Lt,N allocated to rearing and
educating children:
ntNt = χt · Lt,N .(6)
In this setting, 1/χt is a measure of the time (or opportunity) cost of effective labor units, and a
significant component of this cost is education. As mentioned earlier, empirical evidence sugge-
sts a complementarity between human capital and technology (e.g. Goldin and Katz, 1998), and
we specify the cost of children as an increasing function of the economy-wide level of techno-
logy:
χt = χL
ζ−1
t,N /A
ω
t ,(7)
where χ > 0 is a productivity parameter, ζ ∈ (0, 1) is an elasticity representing scarce factors
required in child rearing, At is an output-weighted average of sectoral TFP, and ω > 0 measures
8 Note that Boserup (1965) and Kremer (1993) use the population scale effect to explain the sharp increase of
productivity growth following stagnation in the pre-industrial era, and it is also present in unified growth theory
models by Galor and Weil (2000) and Jones (2001) among others. Empirical evidence from more recent history,
however, is at odds with the scale effect (e.g. Jones, 1995b; Laincz and Peretto, 2006). The fact that it is absent
from our model is important, because population is endogenous, so that accumulating population could be
exploited to artificially increase long-run growth.
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how the cost of children increases with the level of technology. The parameters determining the
evolution of the cost of increments to the labor force (χ, ζ and ω) are estimated as described
below.
We show analytically in Lanz et al. (2017) that this representation of the cost of children is
consistent with the more comprehensive model of Galor and Weil (2000), in which education
decisions are explicit and the relationship between technology and human capital arises endo-
genously. More specifically, in our model the accumulation of human capital is implicit, as it is
functionally related to the contemporaneous level of technology. Like in Galor and Weil (2000),
however, technological progress raises the cost of children by inducing higher educational re-
quirements, and is therefore an important driver of the demographic transition. In other words,
the positive relationship between technology and the cost of effective labor units implies that,
over time, the ‘quality’ of children (measured by their level of education) required to keep up
with technology is favored over the quantity of children, leading to a decline of fertility and
population growth.
In addition to the opportunity cost of time, there is an additional cost to population in-
crements through the requirement that sufficient food must be produced. Formally, we follow
Strulik and Weisdorf (2008) and make agricultural output a necessary condition to sustain the
contemporaneous level of population (see also Vollrath, 2011; Sharp et al., 2012, for similar
approaches):
Y agt = Ntf t ,(8)
where f t is per-capita demand for food. In order to include empirical evidence about the income
elasticity of food demand, we further specify
f = ξ ·
(
Yt,mn
Nt
)κ
,(9)
with income elasticity of food demand κ = 0.25 reflecting estimates reported in Thomas and
Strauss (1997) and Beatty and LaFrance (2005). We further calibrate the parameter ξ = 0.4 so
that aggregate food demand in 1960 is about 15 per cent of world GDP (as per data reported in
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Echevarria, 1997).
Agricultural land conversion
Land is a necessary input to agriculture, and agricultural land Xt has to be converted from a
fixed stock of natural land reserves (X) by applying labor Lt,X.9 In our model, land is therefore
treated as a scarce form of capital, and we write the motion equation for agricultural land as:
Xt+1 = Xt(1− δX) + ψ · Lεt,X , X0 given , Xt ≤ X ,(10)
where the parameters ψ > 0 and ε ∈ (0, 1) are structurally estimated. Through equation (10),
we allow converted land to revert back to its natural state over a fifty-year time frame (i.e. δX =
0.02). Note also that an important implication of (10) is that, as labor is subject to decreasing
returns in land-conversion activities, the marginal cost of land conversion increases with Xt.
Intuitively, this captures the fact that the most productive plots are converted first, whereas
additional land might be less amenable to exploit for agricultural production. An implication is
that the cost associated with bringing marginal plots into production because of uncertainty is
higher than the cost of converting land earlier in the development process.
Households preferences and savings
In the tradition of Barro and Becker (1989), household preferences are defined over own con-
sumption of a (composite) manufactured good, denoted ct, the level of fertility nt and the utility
that surviving members of the family will enjoy in the next period Ui,t+1. Given survival proba-
bility 1 − δN , and simplifying assumptions that (i) children are identical and (ii) parents value
their own utility in period t+1 the same as their children’s (see Jones and Schoonbroodt, 2010),
9 Note that aside from the space needed to grow the food, the model does not quantify the demand for space by
agents in the model, such as industrial use to produce manufactured goods, or residential use to accommodate
the growing population. While this sort of land-use competition is certainly important at a local level, we abstract
from that to focus on an aggregate global representation of development.
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the utility function of a representative household is defined recursively as:
Ut =
c1−γt − 1
1− γ + β[(1− δN ) + nt]
1−ηUt+1 ,(11)
where γ = 2 reflects an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0.5 (e.g. Guvenen, 2006), β =
0.99 is the discount factor and η is an elasticity determining how the utility of parents changes
with the number of surviving members of the household. As we show in Lanz et al. (2017), it
is straightforward to express preferences from the perspective of the dynastic household head,
yielding the following dynastic utility function:
U0 =
∞∑
t=0
βtN1−ηt
c1−γt − 1
1− γ ,(12)
and we set η = 0.01. This implies that altruism towards surviving members of the dynasty
remains almost constant as the number of survivors increases. It makes the household’s objective
close to the standard Classical Utilitarian welfare function.
As in the multi-sector growth model of Ngai and Pissarides (2007), manufacturing output
can either be consumed or invested into a stock of physical capital:
Yt,mn = Ntct + It ,(13)
where Ntct and It measure aggregate consumption and investment respectively. The motion
equation for capital is given by:
Kt+1 = Kt(1− δK) + It , K0 given ,(14)
where δK = 0.1 is the yearly rate of capital depreciation (Schündeln, 2013).
Structural estimation of the model
We formulate the model as a social-planner problem, selecting paths for investment It, and
allocating labor Lt,j and capital Kt,j across activities in order to maximize intertemporal welfare
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(12) subject to technological constraints (1), (2), (3), (5), (8) (10), (13), (14) and feasibility
conditions for capital and labor:
Kt = Kt,mn +Kt,ag , Nt = Lt,mn + Lt,ag + Lt,Amn + Lt,Aag + Lt,N + Lt,X .(15)
The constrained non-linear optimization problem associated with the planner’s program is sol-
ved numerically by searching for a local optimum of the objective function (the discounted sum
of utility) subject to the requirement of maintaining feasibility as defined by the constraints of
the problem.10
We apply simulation methods to structurally estimate parameters determining the cost of
fertility (χ, ζ, ω), labor productivity in R&D (µmn,ag) and labor productivity in land conversion
(ψ, ε). In practice, we first calibrate the initial value of the state variables to match 1960 data,
so that the model is initialized in the first year of the estimation period. For each parameter to
be estimated from the data, we define bounds for possible values (0.1 and 0.9 for elasticities
and 0.03 and 0.3 for labor productivity parameters) and simulate the model for a randomly
drawn set of 10,000 vectors of parameters. We then formulate a minimum distance criterion,
which compares observed 1960-2010 time series for world GDP (Maddison, 1995; Bolt and van
Zanden, 2013), population (United Nations, 1999b, 2013), cropland area (Goldewijk, 2001;
Alexandratos and Bruinsma, 2012) and sectoral TFP (Martin and Mitra, 2001; Fuglie, 2012)
with trajectories simulated from the model.11 In the model these data correspond to Yt,mn+Yt,ag,
Nt, Xt, At,mn and At,ag respectively. Thus, formally, for each vector of parameters and associated
10 The numerical problem is formulated in GAMS and solved with KNITRO (Byrd et al., 1999, 2006), a specialized
software programme for constrained non-linear programs. Note that this solution method can only approximate
the solution to the infinite horizon problem, as finite computer memory cannot accommodate an objective with
an infinite number of terms and an infinite number of constraints. However, for β < 1 only a finite number of
terms matter for the solution, and we truncate the problem to the first T = 200 periods without quantitatively
relevant effects for our results.
11 Note that TFP growth estimates are subject to significant uncertainty, and we conservatively assume that it
declines from 1.5 per cent between 1960 and 1980 to 1.2 per cent between 1980 and 2000, and then stays at 1
per cent over the last decade.
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model solution, we compute:
∑
k
[∑
τ
(Z∗k,τ − Zk,τ )2/
∑
τ
Zk,τ
]
,(16)
where Zk,τ denotes the observed quantity k at time τ and Z∗k,τ is the corresponding value si-
mulated by the model. By gradually refining the bounds of each parameter, we converge to
a vector of parameters that minimizes objective (16). We find that the model closely fits the
targeted data; the resulting vector of estimates and fitted trajectories over the estimation period
are reported and briefly discussed in the supplementary appendix online(see also Lanz et al.,
2017, for an extensive discussion of the estimation results).
At this stage it is important to note that the social planner representation is mainly used
as a tool to make structural estimation of the model tractable: we rationalize the data “as
if” it had been generated by a social planner. Thus market imperfections prevailing over the
estimation period will be reflected in the parameters that we estimate from observed trajectories,
and will thus be reflected in the baseline simulations of the model (i.e. using the model to
extrapolate the behavior of the system observed over the past fifty years).12 But given the
estimated technological parameters, simulations with the model away from the baseline will
reflect a socially optimal allocation of resources.
Introducing stochastic shocks to agricultural productivity
In the basic formulation of the model, which is used for estimating the parameters over the
period 1960-2010, the evolution of sectoral TFP is deterministic and depends on the share of
labor employed in sectoral R&D activities. We now study the evolution of the system beyond
2010, and introduce stochasticity in how agricultural TFP evolves over time. Specifically, it is
12 Because there are externalities in the model, most notably in R&D activities (see Romer, 1994, for example) the
optimum determined by the social planner solution will differ from a decentralized allocation. Thus if we were
able to estimate the parameters using a decentralized solution method, a different set of estimates would be
required to match observed trajectories over the estimation period. As shown by Tournemaine and Luangaram
(2012) in the context of similar model (without land), however, quantitative differences between centralized
and decentralized solutions are likely to be small.
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assumed that technological progress in agriculture is subject to stochastic shocks of size  > 0
that occur with probability p. Conversely with probability 1− p there is no shock to agricultural
productivity (hence  = 0) and the evolution of TFP occurs as per the deterministic specification
described above. Both p and  are assumed to be known by the planner, thus the situation is one
of pure risk.13
Formally, equation (3) describing the evolution of agricultural productivity is augmented
with a non-negative term, which represents the possibility that agricultural TFP may not follow
the functional trajectory we have postulated:
A˜t+1,ag,s = A˜t,ag,s · (1 + ρt,ag,sS − t+1,s) ,(17)
where t+1,s captures the specific realization of the shock in state of the world s, and we index all
variables by s to capture the fact that they are conditional on a specific sequence of t,s over time.
A stochastic shock affects outcomes in period t+1, while the planner only observes the outcome
after allocating resources in period t. We further assume that the planner is an expected utility
maximizer, weighting welfare in the different states of the world by its respective probability.
The ensuing objective function is then:
W =
∑
s
ps
∞∑
t=0
βtN1−ηt,s
c1−γt,s − 1
1− γ ,(18)
with
∑
s ps = 1.
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Even though this stochastic structure is quite simple, the number of possible states of the
world in each period grows at 2t. In turn, because the model is formulated as a non-linear
optimization problem, this implies that the number of variables that needs to be computed
13 We note that the probability of negative shocks and their size might be a function of agricultural activities.
In a companion paper (Lanz et al., 2018), we discuss how the scale of modern agriculture may affect such
negative feedback effect, focusing on the expected impact of negative shocks over time rather than on stochastic
occurrences. In the present paper, however, we focus on a more general exogenous source of uncertainty, in which
the probability and size of shocks is fixed.
14 Note that this formulation implies the standard assumption that markets are complete, both over time and across
states of the world.
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over the whole horizon increases exponentially.15 Given that the dimensionality of the decision
problem grows with the set of possible states of the world, we make two further simplifications.
First, we solve the model from 2010 onwards using two-year time steps (instead of yearly time
steps). This significantly reduces the number of variables that needs to be computed, without
significantly affecting the resulting trajectories.16 Second, we consider shocks in only three time
periods, which is sufficient to illustrate the mechanisms at work.
The shock we consider is a 10 per cent probability that agricultural production declines by 5
per cent each year over two years. This is in the range implied by Figure 1, and is also broadly
consistent with changes in productivity discussed in Nelson et al. (2014) and Cai et al. (2014).
Hence, starting the simulation in 2010, we assume that the first realization of the shock may
occur after 2016 allocation decisions have been made, so that effects are felt in 2018. In the bad
state of the world, which occurs with a probability of 10%, agricultural TFP is (1− 0.05)2 ∼= 0.9
of that prevailing in the good state of the world. In expected value terms, the shock is thus
roughly equivalent to a one per cent decrease in TFP over two years. The same shock can then
occur in 2018, with effects felt in 2020, and in 2020, with effects felt in 2022.
To summarize, we initialize the model in 2010, and negative TFP shocks can occur in 2016,
2018 and 2020, with effects being felt in subsequent periods. After 2022, no more shocks occur
and the problem becomes deterministic (conditional on the state of the world in which the
planner happens to be). Of course, the results would remain qualitatively similar if we were
to consider the reoccurence of shocks beyond 2020, so that it is relatively easy to see how our
results would generalize.
15 More specifically, as the planner faces a dynamic problem, optimal decisions in each time period are conditio-
nal on the history of shocks (i.e. where he is in the exponentially-growing uncertainty tree), and the planner
maximizes the expected utility of his decisions over the remaining event tree. Thus states of the world sharing
a common parent node will share decision variables until the subsequent realization of the productivity shock,
and diverge thereafter, so that computational requirements increase.
16 Increasing the time-steps to evaluate the choice of the controls implies some small differences in optimal paths
relative to the solution using one-year time steps. Another approach would be to formulate the problem recur-
sively and solve it with dynamic programming methods. This approach is, however, subject to dimensionality
restrictions in terms of the number of state variables that can be included.
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Results: Optimal control and simulations
This section provides the main results from solving the stochastic control problem. First, we
describe the particular agricultural productivity scenarios that we focus on. Second, we report
implied trajectories for agricultural technology, agricultural land, population and welfare.
Scenario description
To evaluate the socially optimal response to agricultural productivity risk, we contrast trajec-
tories resulting from four different situations. First, we consider a case in which no shocks to
agricultural TFP will occur, and the planner knows this for sure. This represents our baseline,
as reported in Lanz et al. (2017). Values for selected variables are reported in Table 1. World
population starts at just below 7 billion in 2010 and grows to 8.5 billion by 2030, a 20 per
cent increase. At the same time, cropland area increases by 70 million hectares, or 5 per cent.
These figures are broadly consistent with the latest population projections of the United Nations
(2015) and with land-use projections by FAO, reported in Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012),
and AgMIP, reported in Schmitz et al. (2014). The growth rate of agricultural TFP starts at 0.9
per cent per year in 2010 and declines over time, which is rather conservative compared with
the assumptions used in Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012). Importantly, these figures repre-
sent projections from the fitted model and are thus informed by the evolution of agricultural TFP
from 1960 to 2010, as the estimated model essentially projects forward the pace of development
that has been observed in recent history.
The second situation we consider is also deterministic. We assume that shocks occur in 2016,
2018 and 2020. We label this scenario ‘2016-2018-2020.’ In the period just following each of
the three shocks, agricultural TFP is exogenously brought down by 10 per cent, although the
planner anticipates each shock and can reallocate resources relative to the baseline.
In the third scenario, labeled ‘expected value’, the planner allocates resources taking into
account the expected value of the TFP reduction. In other words, he takes into account the
risk of a 10 per cent reduction in TFP each decision period, but weights that reduction by the
associated probability of 10 per cent. Thus, agricultural TFP growth in each decision period is
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exogenously brought down by around one percentage point. This scenario amounts to analyzing
the allocation decisions of a risk-neutral planner, and where the realization of the shock happens
to be exactly the expected value of the shock.
Finally, we compute trajectories that maximize expected utility. In this situation, the plan-
ner is risk-averse (relative risk aversion is set to γ = 2). He takes into account the risk that
agricultural TFP may decline, and what this entails for social welfare. A key point is that allo-
cation decisions are contingent on the realized state of the world. In other words, after each
decision period in which the risk is realized, the decision tree branches out, and the planner
makes allocation decisions contingent on being in a particular node in the uncertainty tree. By
construction, there are then 23 = 8 possible states of the world in 2030, and thus the same num-
ber of stochastic scenarios for an expected-utility maximizing planner (we label each stochastic
scenario according to the years in which TFP shocks are realized).
Agricultural technology paths
Figure 2 shows the paths for agricultural TFP under alternative scenarios. Starting with the
deterministic scenarios, which are displayed in panel (a), agricultural TFP grows linearly at
around one per cent per year (and falling slightly) under the best-case ‘no shocks’ scenario.
Under the deterministic ‘expected value’ path, TFP grows at a lower pace from 2016 to 2020,
reflecting the expected value of the negative shocks. But before 2016 TFP grows ever so slightly
quicker in the ‘expected value’ scenario, because the planner knows that small negative shocks
will occur from 2016 to 2020 and makes provisions for them (see below). This anticipatory
effect, as well as the subsequent shock to productivity, is more clearly apparent in the worst-case
‘2016-2018-2020’ scenario. Differences across deterministic scenarios are further illustrated in
Figure 3, panel (a), which reports paths for agricultural TFP relative to the ‘no shocks’ scenario.
It shows that, by 2022, agricultural TFP on the ‘expected value’ path is around three per cent
lower than on the ‘no shocks’ path, and in the ‘2016-2018-2020’ scenario TFP it is more than 20
per cent lower.
Turning to the stochastic scenarios, reported in panel (b) of Figures 2 and 3, we distinguish
four different groups of possible realizations according to the number of shocks that occur over
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time (in Figure 2 we also report the posterior probability distribution for each scenario). First,
under the stochastic ‘no shocks’ scenario there is no shock occurring in either 2016, 2018 or
2020, a state of the world with posterior probability of around 0.73. However, unlike the de-
terministic ‘no shocks’ scenario, the planner prepares for the possibility of negative TFP shocks,
and accordingly TFP is slightly higher. By contrast, in stochastic scenario ‘2016-2018-2020’ a
negative shock occurs in all three periods. This scenario has a posterior probability of 0.001.
Before the first shock, the planner does not know for sure whether the world will end up in a
good state, or in a bad, shock state. Because of the consequent need to hedge, agricultural TFP
is not significantly different from that in the deterministic ‘no shocks’ scenario. However, after
2020 agricultural TFP in stochastic scenario ‘2016-2018-2020’ is significantly lower than in the
deterministic ‘2016-2018-2020’ scenario, because the planner did not fully anticipate that he
would end up in the worst outcome possible.
The last two groups of stochastic scenarios include those where either one or two negative
TFP shocks occur. In scenarios ‘2016’, ‘2018’ and ‘2020’, only one TFP shock occurs in each of
these respective years, so that by 2022 agricultural TFP is roughly 10 per cent lower than under
the deterministic ‘no shocks’ scenario. The posterior probability associated with this group of
scenarios is around 0.24. Under scenarios ‘2016-2018,’ ‘2016-2020’ and ‘2018-2020’ there are
two shocks occurring, so that by 2020 agricultural TFP is roughly 20 per cent lower relative to
the deterministic ‘no shocks’ scenario. The posterior probability is around 0.03. Note that, in
both groups of scenarios, TFP growth after 2020 is slightly more rapid than under the ‘no shocks’
scenarios, as more resources are allocated to R&D. However, catching up lost productivity gains
is very slow.
Optimal global land use
Implications for global cropland of alternative paths for agricultural TFP are displayed in Figure
4. We report the differences in cropland area relative to the deterministic ‘no shocks’ scenario (in
million hectares). Recall that, in the deterministic ‘no shocks’ scenario, cropland area increases
by 70 million hectares between 2010 and 2030 (see Table 1).
An important feature of Figure 4 is that, if the planner knows for sure that TFP will decline in
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the future (panel a), optimal cropland area immediately diverges from the ‘no shocks’ scenario,
with significantly more land being converted from natural land reserves. By 2030, an additi-
onal 70 million hectares are converted in the deterministic ‘2016-2018-2020’ scenario, which
corresponds with a doubling of the pace at which land is converted in the ‘no shocks’ scenario.
Why is so much extra land brought into agricultural use? The answer is that the planner prefers
to substitute towards land to maintain the level of food production, because other production
factors have to be taken away from the manufacturing and R&D sectors, with a consequent large
opportunity cost. The deterministic ‘expected value’ path only features a slightly larger stock of
cropland than in the ‘no shocks’ scenario. Indeed, over 20 years only an additional 7 million
hectares are converted.
Turning to the stochastic scenarios, reported in panel (b), we observe that they all feature a
larger stock of land relative to the ‘no shocks’ scenario. However the stock of land in stochastic
scenario ‘2016-2018-2020’ (in which three negative shocks occur) is significantly lower than
that in the corresponding deterministic ‘2016-2018-2020’ scenario. Again, the planner must
always hedge against an uncertain future in the stochastic scenarios, but whenever a negative
TFP shock occurs there is an immediate increase in the amount of agricultural land brought into
the system, in order to compensate for lower agricultural TFP.
Welfare analysis: Population and per-capita consumption
We now turn to the welfare implications of uncertainty about agricultural TFP, focusing on
population dynamics and per-capita consumption of the manufacturing product. Recall that
these are the two variables entering the objective function of the social planner (see equation
12).
Results for global population paths, relative to the deterministic ‘no shocks’ scenario, are
reported in Figure 5. As expected, a reduction in agricultural TFP has a negative impact on
population. This follows from the fact that agricultural productivity growth declines, and the
relative cost of food production increases, so the planner optimally chooses to reduce fertility
on account of the higher cost of feeding the population. The effect is again most striking in the
deterministic ‘2016-2018-2020’ scenario, where the accumulation of population is significantly
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slower compared to the ‘no shocks’ scenario: by 2030, population is 170 million lower. This
is substantial, given it is caused by a reduction of agricultural TFP of 25 per cent below the
deterministic ‘no shocks’ reference scenario over a window of 6 years.
The impact of a reduction of agricultural TFP on population is long lasting, as differences
between paths in which a negative shock occurs and the deterministic ‘no shocks’ scenario are
hysteretic, that is they remain in the long run. In particular, we observe that stochastic scenarios
with the same number of shocks (on the one hand ‘2016’, ‘2018’ and ‘2020’, and on the other
hand ‘2016-2018’, ‘2016-2020’ and ‘2018-2020’) converge to the same loss of global population
relative to the deterministic ‘no shocks’ scenario.
Per-capita consumption of the manufacturing good relative to the deterministic ‘no shocks’
scenario is reported in Figure 6. We find that differences in per-capita consumption between
the deterministic best and worst cases (panel a) fluctuate at around one per cent. This cap-
tures the fact that, in our model, the two consumption goods are complements, so that more
expensive agricultural products also reduce the demand for other consumption goods. In other
words, in the face of a certain or uncertain shock to agricultural TFP in the future, the planner
reduces consumption of both goods in order to smooth consumption over time, and allocates
manufacturing output towards increasing the stock of capital.
In stochastic scenarios, reported in panel b, per-capita consumption fluctuates significantly.
In stochastic scenario ‘no shocks’, per-capita consumption is initially lower than it is in the de-
terministic ‘no shocks’ scenario, although after the first shock the stochastic ‘no shocks’ scenario
reaches almost 0.5 percentage points higher than the deterministic ‘no shocks’ scenario. This
reflects the extra consumption afforded by the hedging behavior once the planner knows that
the anticipated shock will not occur. However, when a negative shock occurs, there is a sharp
decline in per-capita consumption of around 1.5 per cent relative to the deterministic ‘no shocks’
scenario. In the worst-case stochastic scenario ‘2016-2018-2020’ where three shocks occur, the
drop in per-capita consumption is much larger than the corresponding deterministic ‘2016-2018-
2020’ scenario.
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Discussion and sensitivity analysis
Overall, our results suggest that uncertainty about the future evolution of agricultural TFP has
major implications for growth, population and land use. In scenarios where one shock occurs,
agricultural TFP is around 10 per cent lower than in the deterministic ‘no shocks’ trajectory
(which we shall henceforth refer to as the ‘baseline’, for convenience). Given baseline growth
of agricultural TFP of about one per cent per year, this would correspond roughly to a ten-year
hiatus in technological progress. Given our assumptions, the probability that the planner faces
such a state of the world is around 25 per cent. By 2030, our model indicates that a shock in
2016, 2018 or 2020 would trigger cropland expansion of approximately 20 million hectares,
which would be in addition to the 70 million hectares conversion occurring in the baseline,
while the optimal population would be around 40 million lower than in the baseline. If two
shocks occur, so that agricultural TFP is around 17 per cent lower than the baseline, more than
30 million hectares of additional cropland are created. At the same time, global population is
80 million lower.
While these figures may appear to be small relative to the current cropland area and popu-
lation, they are, from a policy perspective, quite large. From 1990 to 2010, about 100 million
hectares of land were brought into cropping. In this period, there has been growing concern
about the value of the lost natural land and associated ecosystem services (e.g. Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). Most of the land conversion has been and will be taking place
in developing countries, where a large share of valuable biodiversity remains, whereas in deve-
loped countries we observe a decline in cropland area (Alexandratos and Bruinsma, 2012). In
addition, as strategies to mitigate climate change, in the future we may see increasing land used
for the production of biofuels, or for afforestation, instead of for food production. The scale
of our results is thus important from the perspective of global conservation and rural land-use
policy. Second, while the ‘loss’ of population is small relative to observed population growth
and that expected to take place in the near future, it is substantial, as it represents the optimal
fertility response to lower agricultural productivity. Put another way, a non-optimal fertility re-
sponse by a large number of households maximizing their own private objectives could generate
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a food-security problem at the aggregate level.
In the following, we assess the sensitivity of our results with respect to three key assumptions
we have made. First, we consider the role of substitutability between land and the capital-
labor composite in agriculture. Second, we discuss how the income elasticity of food demand
affects our results.17 Finally, we study the implications of a scenario in which trend agricultural
productivity growth declines to zero and then becomes negative.
Lower land substitutability (σ = 0.2)
A key determinant of the demand for agricultural land is the parameter σ (see equation 2),
which measures the elasticity of substitution between land and a capital-labor composite. The
baseline value for σ in our model is 0.6. This estimate is derived from Wilde (2013), who
uses data from pre-industrial England to measure long-run substitution possibilities between
land and other inputs. There is, however, some uncertainty about the external validity of this
estimate when it comes to studying study deviations from the baseline trajectories rather than
long run projections (as we do in Lanz et al. (2017)). Other applied modeling work typically
uses lower elasticities of substitution. The example we consider here is taken from Hertel et al.
(2012), who suggest a value of 0.2.
Figure 7 reports results, with σ = 0.2, for agricultural land area under both deterministic
scenarios (panel a) and stochastic scenarios (panel b). Figure 8 reports the corresponding results
for consumption per capita.
Panel (a) of Figure 7 shows that, under the deterministic scenarios, global cropland expands
in a qualitatively similar fashion when substitutability of land is lower. But the size of the
expansion is significantly greater. Relative to the deterministic ‘no shocks’ scenario, an additional
110 million hectares is brought under cultivation globally by 2030 in the worst-case ‘2016-2018-
2020’ scenario. Recall that when σ = 0.6 the equivalent difference between scenarios was about
70 million hectares. Therefore, reducing the substitutability of land results in an additional 40
17 For these two sets of simulation, we re-estimate the model to remain on the same trajectory over the estimation
period 1960-2010. This ensures that the results are comparable with those reported above (see Lanz et al., 2017,
for a complete description of the re-estimation of the parameters).
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million hectares of cropland. Panel (b) shows that, under the stochastic scenarios, the area of
additional cropland (relative to the deterministic ‘no shocks’ scenario) is roughly doubled when
σ = 0.2. For example, the increment rises from 50 to 100 million additional hectares of cropland
by 2030 in the stochastic ‘2016-2018-2020’ scenario.
Figure 8 shows that, despite the greater expansion of cropland that is triggered when the
substitutability of land is lower, the planner makes a substantial reduction in consumption of
the manufactured good. According to panel (a), in the deterministic ‘2016-2018-2020’ scenario,
consumption per capita is 9 per cent lower than in the deterministic ‘no shocks’ scenario by
2030. Panel (b) also shows large reductions in optimal consumption per capita under the various
stochastic shock scenarios. In the worst-case stochastic ‘2016-2018-2020’ scenario, consumption
per capita falls by as much as 17 per cent relative to the deterministic ‘no shocks’ scenario in
2022, before recovering to about 13 per cent lower in 2030. Hence a key consequence of a
lower substitutability of land in agriculture is a higher welfare cost of agricultural TFP shocks.
Subsistence food demand (κ = 0)
In our main model specification, food demand is proportional to the level of population and
is also an increasing (but concave) function of per-capita income (here per-capita output from
the manufacturing sector). This is shown in equation (8), where the parameter κ measures the
income elasticity of food demand. By making a link between manufacturing and agricultural
output, the parameter κ > 0 creates complementarity, so that negative shocks to agricultural
productivity will have a direct negative impact on production in the manufacturing sector. As
an alternative, in this section we consider a case in which food demand is solely proportional to
population (κ = 0). This is equivalent to a case in which food demand represents a physiological
requirement (see Strulik and Weisdorf, 2008; Vollrath, 2011; Sharp et al., 2012), and since food
production is directly proportional to population, it directly enters into the objective of the
planner.
Figure 9 reports results for κ = 0. As usual, panel (a) includes the deterministic scenarios
and panel (b) the stochastic scenarios. Figures 10 and 11 report corresponding results for
population and consumption per capita respectively.
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Figure 9 shows that optimal cropland area is fairly insensitive to changing the income elas-
ticity of food demand. Cropland expansion in all scenarios, deterministic and stochastic, is only
slightly lower relative to the comparable trajectories reported in Figure 4. However, Figure
11 shows that, when the income elasticity of food demand is zero, the trajectory for optimal
consumption per capita differs significantly from that derived with κ = 0.25 (cf. Figure 6). In
particular, when κ = 0 and the planner faces a negative shock to agriculture, the decline in per-
capita consumption relative to the ‘no shock’ scenario is initially small, but then increases with
time. Ultimately, therefore, the decline in per-capita consumption is more pronounced when
κ = 0 than when κ = 0.25.
There are two main drivers of these differences. First, as expected, when the demand for
food is not driven by income (κ = 0), aggregate consumption of the manufactured good declines
in response to an agricultural productivity shock, but not as much as when κ = 0.25. This
is because κ > 0 implies some degree of complementarity between manufacturing and food
consumption. Second, as we show in Figure 10, the decline in population following a shock
is significantly smaller than when κ = 0. As the stock of population grows larger over time,
this in turn implies that the decline in per-capita consumption is larger. Thus, in sum, when
food consumption reflects a subsistence constraint, the planner favors a large population over
per-capita consumption, reflecting a preference over quantity rather than quality.
Negative agricultural productivity growth
Our last extension to the model considers the possibility of a secular decline in the growth trend,
rather than sudden and persistent shocks to a trend of otherwise growing agricultural TFP. This
possibility has been raised by Alston et al. (2009) for example. Specifically, we consider a
trajectory for agricultural TFP in which growth is around 1 per cent from 2010 to 2015 (which
is the same as our main specification), declines to 0.5 per cent during the period 2015 to 2025,
then drops to around zero and smoothly declines thereafter (at the same pace as in the main
specification). The resulting trend is plotted in Figure 12, alongside agricultural TFP growth
in our main specification. To make alternative specifications readily comparable, we constrain
labor allocated to agricultural R&D to remain on its baseline trajectory, so agricultural R&D
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cannot compensate for this secular decline. In other words, the planner cannot add more labor
to agricultural R&D so as to speed up technological progress in that sector. Therefore, since the
planner cannot affect productivity growth, other adjustments are needed to compensate.
Results for agricultural land and per-capita consumption are reported in Figure 13. Global
cropland is expanded gradually but significantly more relative to the main deterministic ‘no
shocks’ specification, with more than 200 million hectares of additional land brought under
cultivation by 2050. When added to cropland expansion under the deterministic ‘no shocks’
scenario, this amounts to a total expansion of about 320 million hectares by 2050. As a sense-
check, the median projection of the AgMIP models is for global cropland to expand by about
175 million hectares by 2050 in a reference scenario without climate change, but the range of
uncertainty (i.e. the inter-model range) extends from about -100 million hectares to more than
400 million hectares (Schmitz et al., 2014).
The right panel of Figure 13 shows that consumption per capita is initially higher under the
scenario of agricultural TFP decline, which may appear puzzling at first. But this increase is due
to the fact that, with an unexpected change in the trajectory for agricultural TFP growth, the
saving rate is too high, and the planner immediately starts to consume more than he initially
intended to. However, despite a short-term increase in per-capita consumption, over the longer
run the difference erodes. Indeed, after 2030 per-capita consumption falls to about 2.7 per
cent below the deterministic ‘no shocks’ scenario by 2050. This result confirms the view that a
decline in agricultural TFP growth in the near future has large and long-lasting macroeconomic
consequences in terms of living-standards.
Conclusion
The development of agricultural technology is a key determinant of the ability to sustain enough
food production in a world with growing population and per-capita income. Yet assessing un-
certainties about its future evolution is difficult because of the wide ranging implications it will
have. In this article we have taken a dynamic-stochastic view of the problem, focusing on the
macroeconomic consequences at the global level, where both technological progress and popu-
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lation are endogenous.
The main contribution of our work is to quantify implications of technological uncertainty,
showing that it implies significantly more land conversion to sustain agricultural production.
This key result is reminiscent of empirical evidence reported in Roberts and Schlenker (2013)
and Scott (2013). Nevertheless, because our model combines a set of carefully selected theo-
retical blocks with an empirically-driven approach to the selection of parameters determining
the quantitative response of the model, it suggests a number of hypothesis that could be tested
empirically in future work. One of these is to focus on closed economies (presumably in the
past) and quantify the change in agricultural land area following a negative agricultural shock.
Another related empirical endeavor suggested by our work is related to substitutability of land
in agriculture. We have shown that our results are significantly affected by assumptions about
this quantity, and further evidence along the lines suggested by Wilde (2013) is warranted.
Our work further shows that population is significantly affected by variability in agricultural
TFP. The scale of the population impacts with our baseline assumptions goes into the tens of
millions, eventually even more than that. We emphasize that, in our model, this effect goes
through lower fertility, as negative agricultural productivity shocks increase the relative cost of
food. In other words, our model captures a socially optimal adjustment of population that is
based on a constant mortality assumption. It is nevertheless indicative of a large food security
issue, as in the real world smooth forward looking adjustments are unlikely.
We close by highlighting that our global view of the problem hides distributional issues.
Most famines and environmental degradation occur at the local level, and in particular in deve-
loping countries. Agricultural TFP shocks may disproportionately affect low-income countries.
Similarly, since land conversion will most likely occur in developing countries, technological
uncertainty may exacerbate further land conversion and biodiversity losses there.
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Notes
1Data on TFP growth are derived from Fuglie and Rada (2015) and FAO (2015). We use the growth accounting
methodology of Fuglie and Rada (2015), which takes into account a broad set of inputs and aggregates TFP growth
rates at the level of 27 macro regions. Compared to Fuglie and Rada (2015), who apply a Hodrick-Prescott filter
to smooth year-on-year output fluctuations before calculating TFP, TFP growth rates reported in Figure 1 are based
on raw (unsmoothed) output data from FAO (2015), with the purpose of highlighting variability of agricultural
productivity growth.
2More specifically, Cai et al. (2014) consider the allocation of land to commercially managed forests (with many
different stock variables capturing different forest vintages) and to biofuel crops. Forest products and energy are
consumed by households. Non-converted ‘natural’ land generates ecosystem services, which are also valued by
households.
3See also Schlenker and Roberts (2009) and Fezzi and Bateman (2015) on the role of temperature variability.
4Note that our model accounts for the fact that remaining reserve lands are likely to be less productive, compared
to land already under cultivation. We come back to this below.
5As noted above, Lanz et al. (2017) provides a comprehensive motivation for the structure of the model, analytical
results on the evolution of population and land, discussion of the selection and estimation of the parameters, as well
as ensuing baseline projections from 2010 onwards. Extensive sensitivity analysis is also reported, showing that the
baseline projections are robust to a number of changes to the structure of the model, which comes from the fact that
we estimate the model over a relatively long horizon. The GAMS code for the model, replicating the baseline runs
reported here, is available on the corresponding author’s website.
6Note that under the assumption that technology is Hicks-neutral, the Cobb-Douglas functional form is consistent
with long-term empirical evidence reported in Antràs (2004).
7We implicitly make use of the law of large number to integrate out random arrival of innovation over discrete
time intervals.
8Note that Boserup (1965) and Kremer (1993) use the population scale effect to explain the sharp increase of
productivity growth following stagnation in the pre-industrial era, and it is also present in unified growth theory
models by Galor and Weil (2000) and Jones (2001) among others. Empirical evidence from more recent history,
however, is at odds with the scale effect (e.g. Jones, 1995b; Laincz and Peretto, 2006). The fact that it is absent from
our model is important, because population is endogenous, so that accumulating population could be exploited to
artificially increase long-run growth.
9Note that aside from the space needed to grow the food, the model does not quantify the demand for space by
agents in the model, such as industrial use to produce manufactured goods, or residential use to accommodate the
growing population. While this sort of land-use competition is certainly important at a local level, we abstract from
that to focus on an aggregate global representation of development.
10The numerical problem is formulated in GAMS and solved with KNITRO (Byrd et al., 1999, 2006), a specialized
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software programme for constrained non-linear programs. Note that this solution method can only approximate
the solution to the infinite horizon problem, as finite computer memory cannot accommodate an objective with an
infinite number of terms and an infinite number of constraints. However, for β < 1 only a finite number of terms
matter for the solution, and we truncate the problem to the first T = 200 periods without quantitatively relevant
effects for our results.
11Note that TFP growth estimates are subject to significant uncertainty, and we conservatively assume that it
declines from 1.5 per cent between 1960 and 1980 to 1.2 per cent between 1980 and 2000, and then stays at 1 per
cent over the last decade.
12Because there are externalities in the model, most notably in R&D activities (see Romer, 1994, for example) the
optimum determined by the social planner solution will differ from a decentralized allocation. Thus if we were able
to estimate the parameters using a decentralized solution method, a different set of estimates would be required to
match observed trajectories over the estimation period. As shown by Tournemaine and Luangaram (2012) in the
context of similar model (without land), however, quantitative differences between centralized and decentralized
solutions are likely to be small.
13We note that the probability of negative shocks and their size might be a function of agricultural activities. In
a companion paper (Lanz et al., 2018), we discuss how the scale of modern agriculture may affect such negative
feedback effect, focusing on the expected impact of negative shocks over time rather than on stochastic occurrences.
In the present paper, however, we focus on a more general exogenous source of uncertainty, in which the probability
and size of shocks is fixed.
14Note that this formulation implies the standard assumption that markets are complete, both over time and across
states of the world.
15More specifically, as the planner faces a dynamic problem, optimal decisions in each time period are conditional
on the history of shocks (i.e. where he is in the exponentially-growing uncertainty tree), and the planner maximizes
the expected utility of his decisions over the remaining event tree. Thus states of the world sharing a common parent
node will share decision variables until the subsequent realization of the productivity shock, and diverge thereafter,
so that computational requirements increase.
16Increasing the time-steps to evaluate the choice of the controls implies some small differences in optimal paths
relative to the solution using one-year time steps. Another approach would be to formulate the problem recursively
and solve it with dynamic programming methods. This approach is, however, subject to dimensionality restrictions
in terms of the number of state variables that can be included.
17For these two sets of simulation, we re-estimate the model to remain on the same trajectory over the estimation
period 1960-2010. This ensures that the results are comparable with those reported above (see Lanz et al., 2017, for
a complete description of the re-estimation of the parameters).
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Table 1: Deterministic ‘no shocks’ scenario: Baseline values for selected variables
2010 2020 2030
World population (billion) 6.95 7.73 8.47
Cropland area (billion hectares) 1.62 1.66 1.69
Yearly agricultural TFP growth rate 0.0094 0.0086 0.0078
Per-capita consumption (thousand intl. dollars) 4.29 4.88 5.46
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Figure 1: Total factor productivity growth in agriculture, 1960–2010
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Notes: Plotted data on yearly TFP growth are derived from Fuglie and Rada (2015) and FAO (2015). Average
change in TFP measures yearly growth rate of TFP averaged (without weights) across 27 macro regions defined
in Fuglie and Rada (2015). Minimum and maximum yearly growth rates across regions are also reported. See
footnote 1 for more details on the reported data.
Figure 2: Agricultural TFP under alternative scenarios
(a) Deterministic scenarios
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(b) Stochastic scenarios
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Figure 3: Agricultural TFP relative to the deterministic ‘no shocks’ scenario
(a) Deterministic scenarios
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(b) Stochastic scenarios
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Figure 4: Global cropland area relative to the deterministic ‘no shocks’ scenario
(a) Deterministic scenarios
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(b) Stochastic scenarios
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Figure 5: Global population relative to the deterministic ‘no shocks’ scenario
(a) Deterministic scenarios
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(b) Stochastic scenarios
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Figure 6: Per-capita consumption relative to the deterministic ‘no shocks’ scenario
(a) Deterministic scenarios
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(b) Stochastic scenarios
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Figure 7: Global cropland area relative to the deterministic ‘no shocks’ scenario (σ = 0.2)
(a) Deterministic scenarios
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(b) Stochastic scenarios
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Figure 8: Per-capita consumption relative to the deterministic ‘no shocks’ scenario (σ = 0.2)
(a) Deterministic scenarios
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(b) Stochastic scenarios
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Figure 9: Global cropland area relative to the deterministic ‘no shocks’ scenario (κ = 0)
(a) Deterministic scenarios
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(b) Stochastic scenarios
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Figure 10: Global population relative to the deterministic ‘no shocks’ scenario (κ = 0)
(a) Deterministic scenarios
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(b) Stochastic scenarios
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Figure 11: Per-capita consumption relative to the deterministic ‘no shocks’ scenario (κ = 0)
(a) Deterministic scenarios
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(b) Stochastic scenarios
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Figure 12: Agricultural TFP: Negative productivity growth scenario
(a) Agricultural TFP in levels
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(b) Agricultural TFP relative to baseline
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Figure 13: Global cropland and per-capita consumption: Negative productivity growth scenario
(a) Cropland relative to baseline
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